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Abstract: This paper analyses the statistical distribution of war sizes. Using the 
method recently proposed by Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009), we find 
moderate support for a Pareto-type distribution (power law), using data from 
different sources (COW and UCDP) and periods. A power law accurately 
describes not only the size distribution of all wars, but also the distribution of the 
sample of wars in most years. However, the log-normal distribution is a 
plausible alternative model that we cannot reject. Furthermore, the study of the 
growth rates of battle deaths reveals a clear decreasing pattern; the growth of 
deaths declines faster if the number of initial deaths is greater. 
 
Keywords: war size distribution, battle deaths, power law, Pareto distribution. 
JEL: D74, F51, N40.  
 
 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
In one of the first analyses of the statistics of war, Richardson (1948) studied the 
variation of the frequency of fatal quarrels with magnitude. He collected a dataset for 
violent incidents (wars and homicides), measured by the number of victims, from 1820 
to 1945, and his calculations revealed that the relationship between magnitude (size) 
and frequency (number) of both wars and small crime incidents could be satisfactorily 
fitted by a straight decreasing line with a negative slope, suggesting a power law 
function. This striking empirical regularity could have important implications, but it has 
remained almost unexplored from either a theoretical or an empirical point of view for 
many years.  
Only a few papers follow Richardson’s approach (Roberts and Turcotte 1998; 
Cederman 2003; Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007), and they also find evidence of 
power law behaviour. Roberts and Turcotte (1998) find a power law dependence of 
number on intensity, taking into consideration several alternative measures of the 
intensity of a war in terms of battle deaths, using Levy’s (1983) dataset of 119 wars 
from 1500 to 1974 and Small and Singer’s (1982) dataset of 118 wars during the period 
from 1816 to 1980. Cederman (2003) finds strong support for a power law distribution, 
using interstate war data from 1820 to 1997 from the Correlates of War Project. Based 
on this empirical evidence, he also proposes an agent-based model of war and state 
formation that exhibits the same kind of power law regularities. Clauset, Young, and 
Gleditsch (2007) extend Richardson’s analysis to study the frequency and severity of 
terrorist attacks worldwide since 1968, also finding a linear relationship between the 
frequency and the severity of these deadly incidents. 
The results of these studies are similar to the original result of Richardson. 
However, as Levy and Morgan (1984) point out, all these studies focus on the 
distribution of all wars rather than on the wars occurring in a given period, although the 
frequency of wars in a given period is also assumed to be inversely related to their 
seriousness. Levy and Morgan (1984) try to address this latter point by calculating 
Pearson correlation indexes between frequency and intensity, finding a negative 
correlation. They use Levy’s (1983) dataset for wars between 1500 and 1974, 
aggregating wars in 25-year periods.  
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Finally, there is another strand of related literature. All the studies previously 
mentioned use between-conflict data, but there are other papers (Bohorquez et al. 2009; 
Johnson et al. 2011) that focus on within-conflict incidents (attacks). Surprisingly, these 
studies conclude that the size distribution or timing of within-conflict events is also 
power law distributed. Bohorquez et al. (2009) show that the sizes and timing of 54,679 
violent events reported as part of nine diverse insurgent conflicts exhibit remarkable 
similarities. In all cases, the authors cannot reject the hypothesis that the size 
distribution of the events follows a power law, but they can reject log-normality. They 
build on this empirical evidence to propose a unified theoretical model of human 
insurgency that reproduces these features, explaining conflict-specific variations 
quantitatively in terms of underlying rules of engagement. Johnson et al. (2011) uncover 
a similar dynamic pattern using data about fatal attacks by insurgent groups in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and by terrorist groups operating worldwide. They estimate the 
escalation rate and the timing of fatal attacks, finding that the average number of 
fatalities per fatal attack is fairly constant in a conflict. Furthermore, when they 
calculate the progress curve they obtain a straight line, which is best fitted by a power 
law.  
This paper contributes in several ways. First, in the spirit of Richardson (1948) 
we estimate the distribution of a pool of all wars. Second, using yearly data we estimate 
the war size distribution by year from 1989 to 2010, to study whether there are 
differences between the overall distribution of all wars and the year-by-year distribution 
(Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch (2007) carry out a similar analysis for terrorist attacks 
by year). Finally, we study the behaviour of the growth rates for those conflicts that last 
longer than one period.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the databases we use. 
Section 3 contains the statistical analysis of war size distribution and its evolution over 
time, and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
We measure war size using the number of recorded battle deaths, i.e. the battle-
related combatant fatalities. Data come from two international datasets: the Correlates 
of War (COW) (Version 4.0) (2010) Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 5) (2011). 
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We consider wars in which the government of a state was involved in one form 
or another. The COW Project distinguishes three kinds of state wars: interstate 
(between/among states), intra-state (within states) and extra-state (between/among a 
state(s) and a non-state entity). According to the COW war typology, a war must have 
sustained combat, involve organised armed forces, and result in a minimum of 1,000 
battle-related combatant fatalities within a 12-month period; for a state to be considered 
a war participant, the minimum requirement is that it has to either commit 1,000 troops 
to the war or suffer 100 battle-related deaths. This requisite condition was established 
by Small and Singer (1982). Interstate wars are those in which a territorial state is 
engaged in a war with another state. Intra-state wars are wars that predominantly take 
place within the recognised territory of a state; they include civil, regional, and 
intercommunal wars. Finally, extra-state wars are those in which a state is engaged in a 
war with a political entity that is not a state, outside the borders of the state. Extra-state 
wars are of two general types: colonial and imperial. The COW data cover 95 different 
interstate wars from 1823 to 2003, 190 intra-state wars from 1818 to 2007 and 162 
extra-state wars from 1816 to 2004.1 Thus, the COW dataset covers all conflicts over a 
long period and enables us to estimate the size distribution of a wide pool of modern 
wars. 
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is a joint project between the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala 
University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research 
Institute in Oslo (PRIO). The UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths”.2 There are two important differences between the UCDP and the COW data. 
First, the UCDP dataset includes four different types of conflict: extrasystemic, 
interstate, internal and internationalised internal. Second, the UCDP dataset contains 
information about conflicts by year from 1989 to 2010. Thus, we can estimate the year-
by-year size distribution.  
                                                 
1 More information about war classifications and the lists of interstate, intra-state and extra-state wars 
included in the database can be found in Sarkees and Wayman (2010). 
2 More information about the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset can be found in Gleditsch et al. 
(2002). The dataset is available for download from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. 
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The data presented by UCDP are based on information taken from a selection of 
publicly available sources, printed as well as electronic. The sources include news 
agencies, journals, research reports and documents of international and multinational 
organisations and NGOs. Global, regional and country-specific sources are used for all 
countries. The basic source for the collection of general news reports is the Factiva 
news database (previously known as the Reuters Business Briefing), which contains 
over 8,000 sources. There is not usually much information available on the exact 
number of deaths in a conflict, and media coverage varies considerably from country to 
country. However, the fatality estimates given by UCDP are based on publicly 
accessible sources. 
The project uses automated events data search software that makes it possible to 
retrieve all reports containing information about individuals who have been killed or 
injured. Each news report is then read by UCDP staff, and every event that contains 
information about individuals who have been killed is coded manually into an events 
dataset. Ideally, these individual figures are corroborated by two or more independent 
sources. These fatalities are later aggregated into low, high and best estimates for every 
calendar year. The lack of available information means that it is possible that there are 
more fatalities than the UCDP high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there are fewer 
than the UCDP best estimate. Here we use the best estimate figure in all cases. 
Table 1 shows the sample sizes for each year and the descriptive statistics. There 
is a decrease in the number of ongoing armed conflicts over time, and this decrease is 
especially marked in the last few years (the average number of wars by year from 1989 
to 2000 is 43.8, while in the 2001–2010 period it is 33.3). Moreover, the conflicts in the 
last few years have also been less intense: the average number of battle deaths per war 
also decreases over time.  
Roberts and Turcotte (1998) suggest that a pool of wars from different periods 
(like the COW dataset) can be criticised because the global population changes 
substantially over a long time period. The same number of battle deaths would not 
represent the same war intensity if there had been a huge change in the world 
population. Some authors try to correct for this by using relative measures of size: Levy 
(1983) defines the intensity of a war as the number of battle deaths divided by the 
population of Europe in millions at the time of the war, because estimates of the total 
world population may not be reliable for early periods. In this paper we also define a 
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relative measure of size as the ratio of battle deaths to the sum of the populations (in 
thousands) of the combatant countries of the conflict in the year of the start of the 
conflict.3 Population data are also taken from the COW Project.4 This ratio represents 
the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants in the countries involved in the war.5 
However, note that this normalisation is not necessary when all the conflicts are in the 
same period.  
3. Results 
3.1 War size distribution 
Let S  denote the war size (measured by recorded battle deaths); if this is 
distributed according to a power law, also known as a Pareto distribution, the density 
function is 
a
S
S
S
aSp
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= 1)(  SS ≥∀  and the complementary cumulative density 
function ( )SP  is 1)( +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
a
S
SSP  SS ≥∀ , where 0>a  is the Pareto exponent (or the 
scaling parameter) and S  is the number of battle deaths in the war at the truncation 
point, which is the lower bound to the power law behaviour. It is easy to obtain the 
expression aSAR −⋅= , which relates the empirically observed rank R  (1 for the largest 
conflict, 2 for the second largest and so on) to the war size. As Clauset and Wiegel 
(2010) point out, one of the properties of the power law is that there is no qualitative 
difference between large and small events; multiplying the argument ( S ) by some 
factor λ  results in a change in the corresponding frequency that is independent of the 
argument. 
This expression is applied to the study of very varied phenomena, such as the 
distribution of the number of times different words appear in a book (Zipf 1949), the 
intensity of earthquakes (Kagan 1997), the losses caused by floods (Pisarenko 1998), 
                                                 
3 The author thanks one anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
4 The COW Project includes a fourth category of war, wars between or among non-state entities. We 
exclude these wars (62 observations) from our analysis because in these cases it is not possible to quantify 
the populations involved on any side of the conflict (or even the population of the region in which the 
combat occurred, since COW only distinguishes six major areas), and thus no relative measure of size can 
be calculated. 
5 We have tried alternative measures of relative size. In the same way as Levy (1983), we also defined a 
relative measure of size as the ratio of battle deaths to the European population (in thousands) in the year 
prior to the start of the conflict, and the results were qualitatively similar. 
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forest fires (Roberts and Turcotte 1998), city size distribution (Soo 2005) and country 
size distribution (Rose 2006). 
Taking natural logarithms, we obtain the linear specification that is usually 
estimated 
uSaAR +−= lnlnln ,   (1) 
where u  represents a standard random error ( ( ) 0=uE  and ( ) 2σ=uVar ) and Aln  is a 
constant. The greater the coefficient aˆ , the more homogeneous are the war sizes. 
Similarly, a small coefficient (a coefficient less than 1) indicates a heavy-tailed 
distribution. However, this regression analysis, which is commonly used in the 
literature, presents some drawbacks that have been recently highlighted by Clauset, 
Shalizi, and Newman (2009); of these, the main one is that the estimates of the Pareto 
exponent are subject to systematic and potentially large errors.6 
Therefore, to estimate power laws we will use the innovative method proposed 
by Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009). This has been used to fit power laws to 
different datasets; Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) apply it to find moderate 
support for the power tail behaviour of the intensity of wars from 1816–1980, measured 
as the number of battle deaths per 10,000 of the combined populations of the warring 
nations (datasets from Roberts and Turcotte 1998, and Small and Singer 1982), and the 
behaviour of the severity of terrorist attacks worldwide from February 1968 to June 
2006, measured as the number of deaths directly resulting from the attacks (data from 
Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007). They also use this method with other datasets 
from many very different fields (e.g., the human populations of US cities in the 2000 
US Census, the intensity of earthquakes occurring in California between 1910 and 1992, 
or the number of “hits” received by websites from America Online internet service 
customers in a single day). Recently, Brzezinski (2014) used this methodology to study 
the power law behaviour of the upper tails of wealth distributions, using data on the 
wealth of the richest persons taken from the ‘rich lists’ produced by business 
magazines. 
                                                 
6 Preliminary results obtained from the OLS estimation of Eq. (1) indicate that the power law provides a 
very good fit to the real behaviour of the whole distribution (all the observations) for our pool of COW 
wars (using deaths and relative deaths) and the yearly UCDP dataset. The estimated 2R  is greater than 
0.9 in all cases, and the estimated Pareto exponent is always less than 1, indicating that the distribution is 
heavy-tailed; this means that the average war loss is controlled by the largest conflicts. However, as 
indicated in the main text, these OLS results are not robust (Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009). 
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The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of the Pareto exponent is:  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= ∑
=
n
i
i
S
Sna
1
ln1ˆ , SSi ≥∀ . 
The ML estimator is more efficient than the usual OLS line regression if the underlying 
stochastic process is really a Pareto distribution (Gabaix and Ioannides 2004; Goldstein, 
Morris, and Yen 2004). Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) propose an iterative 
method to estimate the adequate truncation point ( S ). The exponent a  is estimated for 
each SSi ≥  using the ML estimator (bootstrapped standard errors are calculated with 
1,000 replications), and then the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic is computed for 
the data and the fitted model. The S  lower bound that is finally chosen corresponds to 
the value of iS  for which the KS statistic is the smallest.
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Figure 1 shows the results for the COW data, covering all state (inter-, intra- and 
extra-state) wars from 1816 to 2007. The data, plotted as a complementary cumulative 
distribution function (CCDF), are fitted by a power law, and its exponent is estimated 
using the ML estimator. For illustrative purposes, a log-normal distribution is also fitted 
to the data by maximum likelihood (blue dotted line). The optimal lower bound for both 
distributions is estimated using Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman’s (2009) method. The 
black line shows the power law behaviour of the upper tail distribution. The first graph 
shows the battle deaths distribution, with an estimated Pareto exponent of 1.74 for 
≥deaths 9,540, and the second displays the relative deaths, with a scaling parameter of 
1.90 for ≥deathsrelative 0.60. The power law appears to provide a good description of 
the behaviour of the distribution. In contrast, the fit of the log-normal distribution is 
poor, especially for the highest observations. Nevertheless, visual methods can lead to 
inaccurate conclusions (González-Val, Ramos, and Sanz-Gracia 2013), especially at the 
upper tail, because of large fluctuations in the empirical distribution (Clauset and 
Woodard 2013), so next we test the goodness of fit with statistical tests. 
Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) propose several goodness of fit tests. In 
the same way as Brzezinski (2014), we use a semi-parametric bootstrap approach. The 
procedure is based on the iterative calculation of the KS statistic for 1,000 bootstrap 
                                                 
7 The power laws and the statistical tests are estimated using the poweRlaw R package developed by 
Colin S. Gillespie (based on the R code of Laurent Dubroca and Cosma Shalizi and the Matlab code by 
Aaron Clauset) and the Stata codes by Michal Brzezinski, which are all freely available on their 
webpages. 
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dataset replications. The null hypothesis is the power law behaviour of the original 
sample for SSi ≥ . Table 2 shows the results of the tests; the p-values of the test for both 
COW samples, deaths and relative deaths, are higher than 0.1, confirming that the 
power law is a good approximation to the real behaviour of the data. This evidence 
confirms Cederman’s (2003) results and the original result of Richardson (1948). 
Finally, we also compare the linear power law fit with the fit provided by 
another nonlinear distribution, the log-normal. This is done using Vuong’s model 
selection test, comparing the power law with the log-normal.8 The test is based on the 
normalised log-likelihood ratio; the null hypothesis is that both distributions are equally 
far from the true distribution, while the alternative is that one of the test distributions is 
closer to the true distribution. High p-values indicate that one model cannot be favoured 
over the other, and this is the conclusion obtained with the COW data – see Table 2. 
Overall, using Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman’s (2009) terminology, we get moderate 
support for the power law behaviour of our pool of wars: the power law is a good fit but 
there is a plausible alternative as well. 
Remember that this is the distribution of a pool of all wars over a long period. 
Next, we use the yearly UCDP dataset to estimate the war size distribution by year from 
1989 to 2010. We fit a power law for each period of our yearly sample of wars; Figure 2 
displays the results for two representative years (1998 and 2007) of the two possible 
cases.9 In 1998 the distribution seems clearly nonlinear and the power law fit is poor, 
while in 2007 the power law provides a good fit to the real behaviour of the distribution. 
The latter one is the predominant case, because the power law is rejected in only 7 of 
the 22 years considered; Figure 3 summarizes the results of the estimates by year, 
showing the estimated Pareto exponent and the results of the goodness of fit test for a 
5% significance level (p-values are reported in Table 2). The power law fit improves 
over time because most of the rejections are located in the first periods of our sample. 
Nevertheless, the results of Vuong’s model selection test (Table 2) indicate that the fit 
provided by the power law is not significantly better than the log-normal fit in any year. 
                                                 
8 In Figures 1 and 2 the lower bound for both distributions (log-normal and power law) is calculated by 
using Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman’s (2009) method. The lower bounds can be different, but to compare 
the distributions the threshold must be the same for both distributions, so to run the test we use the same 
lower bound, the estimated value corresponding to the power law.  
9 Results for all the years are available from the author upon request. 
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Although in some years the standard error of the scaling parameter is high 
because the number of observations above the estimated truncation point is low, the 
estimated values fluctuate between 2 and 2.5. These values are similar to those obtained 
by Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch (2007) and Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) in 
their analysis of terrorist attacks. Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch (2007) develop a 
theoretical model to explain this power law pattern.10 Their model is a variation of the 
Reed and Hughes (2002) mechanism of competing exponentials, which yields to a 
power law distribution for the observed severities. The scaling parameter depends on 
the growth rate for attacks and the hazard rate imposed on events by states, and, making 
some assumptions (equal rates with a slight advantage to states due to their longevity 
and large resource base), the model generates 5.2≈a . Clauset and Wiegel (2010) 
provide an alternative theoretical explanation, generalising the model of Johnson et al. 
(2005). This model, which is based on the notion of self-organised criticality and which 
describes how terrorist cells might aggregate and disintegrate over time, also predicts 
that the distribution of attack severities should follow a power law form with an 
exponent of 2.5. 
3.2 Growth analysis 
The above results show what we consider to be a snapshot of the size 
distribution of wars from 1989 to 2010. For each year we obtained the estimated 
coefficients of the Pareto exponent, and a goodness of fit test that indicates the 
suitability of the power law model in most of the periods. Literature that studies the 
distributions of financial assets (Gabaix et al. 2006) and of firm (Sutton 1997) and city 
(Gabaix 1999) sizes usually concludes that this kind of Pareto-type distribution is 
generated by a random growth process. Moreover, a random growth process can also 
generate a log-normal distribution, a plausible alternative model that we could not reject 
in the previous empirical analysis. The hypothesis usually tested is that the growth of 
the variable is independent of its initial size.11 To check whether this is true for war 
sizes we carry out a dynamic analysis of growth rates using two different non-
parametric tools. The UCDP dataset enables us to calculate the yearly growth rates of 
battle deaths for conflicts that last more than one year. We define ig  as the growth rate 
                                                 
10 Saperstein (2010) and Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch (2010) discuss the implications of Clauset, 
Young, and Gleditsch’s (2007) model. 
11 In firm and city size literature this hypothesis is called “Gibrat’s law”. 
 10
( )1lnln −− itit SS  and normalise it (by subtracting the contemporary mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation in the relevant year), where itS  is the ith war’s size (battle 
deaths).12 We build a pool with all the growth rates between two consecutive years; 
there are 639 battle deaths–growth rate pairs in the period 1989–2010. 
First, we study how the distribution of growth rates is related to the distribution 
of initial battle deaths (Ioannides and Overman 2004). Figure 4 shows the stochastic 
kernel estimation of the distribution of normalised growth rates, conditional on the 
distribution of initial battle deaths at the same date. In order to make the interpretation 
easier, the contour plot is also shown. The plot reveals a slight negative relationship 
between the two distributions, although there is a great deal of variance. However, most 
of the observations are concentrated into two peaks of density; the higher one 
corresponds to conflicts with a small number of deaths (below 5 on the logarithmic 
scale, i.e. fewer than 150 casualties), and the lower one to the less numerous group of 
conflicts with a high number of battle deaths (7 on the logarithmic scale, which means 
around 1,100 casualties). Note that the conditional distribution of growth rates is equal 
to zero for both types of war, indicating that both distributions are independent for most 
of the observations. 
To get a clearer view of the relationship between growth and initial battle deaths 
we also perform a non-parametric analysis using kernel regressions (Ioannides and 
Overman 2003). This consists of taking the following specification: 
( ) iii smg ε+= ,    
where ig  is the normalised growth rate and is  the logarithm of the ith war’s number of 
initial battle deaths. Instead of making assumptions about the functional relationship m , 
( )smˆ  is estimated as a local mean around the point s  and is smoothed using a kernel, 
which is a symmetrical, weighted and continuous function in s .  
To estimate ( )smˆ , the Nadaraya–Watson method is used, as it appears in Härdle 
(1990, Chapter 3), based on the following expression: 
                                                 
12 Growth rates need to be normalised because we are considering growth rates from different periods 
jointly in a pool. 
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where hK  denotes the dependence of the kernel K  (in this case an Epanechnikov) on 
the bandwidth h . We use the bandwidth 5.0=h .13 As the growth rates are normalised, 
if growth was independent of the initial number of deaths the non-parametric estimate 
would be a straight line on the zero value, and values different from zero would involve 
deviations from the mean. 
The results are shown in Figure 5. The graph also includes the bootstrapped 95% 
confidence bands (calculated from 500 random samples with replacement). The 
estimates confirm the negative relationship between size and growth observed in Figure 
4, although we cannot reject the premise that the growth is different from zero (random 
growth) for most of the distribution. Random growth would explain the observed war 
size distribution, because it implies a Pareto (power law) distribution if there is a lower 
bound to the distribution (which can be very low) (see Gabaix 1999). Nevertheless, the 
decreasing pattern is clear: the greater the number of initial deaths, the lower the growth 
rate. This points to a certain degree of convergence (mean reversion) across wars, which 
we can interpret as evidence of the “explosive” behaviour of conflicts, because the 
greater the number of initial deaths, the faster the decline in the growth of deaths.  
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) explain how random growth can be compatible 
with a degree of convergence in the evolution of growth rates, by putting forward what 
they call deviations from random growth that do not affect the distribution. We can 
adapt their theoretical framework to war growth. We start from: 
( ) itititit tXSS εμ +=− − ,lnln 1 ,   (2) 
where itX  is a possibly time-varying vector of the characteristics of war i ; ( )tX it ,μ  is 
the expectation of war i ’s growth rate as a function of the specific conflict 
characteristics at time t ; and itε  is white noise. In the simplest specification, itε  is 
independently and identically distributed over time (this means that itε  has a zero mean 
                                                 
13 Results using Silverman’s optimal kernel bandwidth were similar. 
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and a constant variance that is uncorrelated with isε  for st ≠ ), and ( )tX it ,μ  is 
constant. 
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) consider two types of deviations, relaxing both 
assumptions. We are interested in the consequences of relaxing the assumption of an 
i.i.d. itε , assuming constant ( ) μμ =tX it , . The following stochastic structure for itε  is 
assumed: 1−−+= itititit b ηηε , where itb  is i.i.d. and itη  follows a stationary process. 
Replacing in (2) we obtain:  
0
1
0lnln iit
t
s
isiit btSS ηημ −++=− ∑
=
. 
The term ∑ =ts isb1  gives a unit root in the growth process (hence random 
growth), while the term itη  can have any stationarity. According to Gabaix and 
Ioannides (2004), this means that we can obtain a Pareto-type distribution even if the 
war growth process contains a mean reversion component, as long as it contains a non-
zero unit root component. 
4. Conclusions 
Richardson’s (1948) seminal study established a negative relationship between 
the frequency and the severity of wars, introducing a new empirical regularity. The aim 
of this paper is to provide robust evidence for or against Richardson’s claim. 
First, we estimate the distribution of a pool of all wars using COW state (inter-, 
intra- and extra-state) war data from 1816 to 2007. Our estimates confirm Cederman’s 
(2003) results and the original result of Richardson (1948); the power law provides a 
good fit to the real behaviour of the distribution. Second, using UCDP yearly data we 
estimate the war size distribution by year from 1989 to 2010, finding that a power law 
accurately describes the size distribution of wars in most of the periods. Furthermore, 
the estimated values fluctuate around 2.5, a value similar to that of other studies that 
have analysed terrorist attacks. If we add that some studies conclude that the size 
distribution and timing of within-conflict events is also power law distributed 
(Bohorquez et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2011), all this evidence points to a universal 
pattern across and within war sizes. 
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Finally, a study of the growth rates of battle deaths reveals that random growth 
cannot be rejected for most of the distribution, which could explain the resulting Pareto 
(power law) size distribution. Nevertheless, a clear decreasing pattern is also observed: 
the greater the number of initial deaths the faster the decline in the growth of deaths, 
although this mean reversion behaviour can be compatible with random growth.  
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Table 1. Armed conflict battle deaths: descriptive statistics by year 
 
Year Observations Mean Size Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Max. Location 
1989 43 1,256.651 3,023.588 25 18,403 Ethiopia 
1990 50 1,631.6 5,057.416 25 30,633 Ethiopia 
1991 51 1,372.471 3,436.919 25 21,790 Iraq, Kuwait 
1992 53 676.2453 1,142.743 25 4,989 Bosnia-Herzegovina
1993 45 852.6889 1,955.79 25 12,054 Angola 
1994 47 727.0213 1,505.68 25 8,829 Afghanistan 
1995 41 698.7318 1,249.098 25 5,061 Afghanistan 
1996 41 591.0732 955.7285 25 3,533 Turkey 
1997 39 927.3075 1,948.249 25 10,033 Congo 
1998 40 881.8 1,297.505 25 4,891 Sudan 
1999 39 2,035.283 7,521.621 25 47,192 Eritrea, Ethiopia 
2000 37 2,016.649 8,161.813 25 50,000 Eritrea, Ethiopia 
2001 36 603.6111 800.9718 25 3,407 Sudan 
2002 32 551.4063 787.1231 25 3,947 Nepal 
2003 30 697.5001 1,512.132 25 8,202 
Australia, Iraq, 
United Kingdom, 
United States of 
America 
2004 32 566.6875 891.6652 25 3,499 Iraq 
2005 32 358.0313 533.4645 25 2,364 Iraq 
2006 33 527.2122 853.8419 25 3,656 Iraq 
2007 35 487.7714 1,049.312 25 5,828 Afghanistan 
2008 37 738.6217 1,586.588 25 8,413 Sri Lanka 
2009 36 858.3056 1,805.982 25 8,162 Sri Lanka 
2010 30 640.6 1,425.88 25 6,374 Afghanistan 
 
Source: UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v5 (2011), available at: 
www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/  
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Table 2. Power law fit 
 
Data Lower bound Pareto exponent Power law test 
Power law vs. 
log-normal 
 S  aˆ  Standard error p-value p-value 
COW pool 1816-2007, deaths 9540 1.74 0.11 0.18 0.49 
COW pool 1816-2007, relative deaths 0.60 1.90 0.12 0.58 0.26 
UCDP yearly data:      
1989 25 1.42 0.07 0.00 0.30 
1990 1058 2.11 0.30 0.81 0.67 
1991 25 1.45 0.06 0.01 0.46 
1992 25 1.48 0.07 0.02 0.17 
1993 53 1.54 0.09 0.22 0.18 
1994 935 2.48 0.43 0.58 0.59 
1995 97 1.65 0.12 0.03 0.24 
1996 25 1.52 0.08 0.09 0.32 
1997 25 1.49 0.08 0.22 0.26 
1998 25 1.45 0.07 0.00 0.54 
1999 1403 2.26 0.40 0.98 0.65 
2000 1010 2.14 0.35 0.92 0.66 
2001 72 1.59 0.11 0.00 0.57 
2002 1086 3.54 1.04 0.96 0.66 
2003 478 2.27 0.37 0.71 0.68 
2004 25 1.50 0.09 0.01 0.31 
2005 1046 4.71 1.66 0.95 0.69 
2006 191 1.99 0.22 0.67 0.50 
2007 69 1.74 0.14 0.56 0.31 
2008 295 1.91 0.23 0.93 0.46 
2009 353 2.05 0.26 0.53 0.70 
2010 175 1.83 0.21 0.95 0.50 
 
Note: The lower bound and the Pareto exponent are estimated by using Clauset, Shalizi, 
and Newman’s (2009) methodology. The power law test is a goodness of fit test. H0 is 
that there is power law behaviour for SSi ≥ . The power law vs. log-normal test is 
Vuong’s model selection test, based on the normalised log-likelihood ratio: H0 is that 
both distributions are equally far from the true distribution while HA is that one of the 
test distributions is closer to the true distribution. 
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Figure 1. The intensity of wars from 1816 to 2007, 447 observations 
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Note: COW inter-, intra- and extra-state war data (v4.0). The data are plotted as a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). 
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Figure 2. War size distribution in 1998 and 2007 
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Note: UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v5 (2011). The data are plotted as a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). 
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Figure 3. Power law fit, UCDP yearly data 
 
 
Notes: UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v5 (2011). The Pareto exponent is estimated 
by using Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman’s (2009) methodology. The graph also shows 
the results of the power law goodness of fit test for a 5% significance level.  
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Figure 4. Stochastic kernel, battle deaths to growth rates 
 
Note: UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v5 (2011), 639 observations. 
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Figure 5. Kernel estimate of growth (bandwidth 0.5), 639 observations 
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Note: UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset v5 (2011). 
 
 
 
